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FALSE PREMISES IN WELFARE AND SOCIAL
SECURITY: CONTINUING OBSTACLES
TO REFORM
INTRODUCTION
The American governmental assistance maze needs sweeping re-
form. Federal programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren (AFDC), Social Security, and state assistance subsidies overlap
and yet leave gaps through which the unfortunate may fall.' Benefits
and eligibility requirements of the programs vary widely from state to
state2 and their administration is both awkward and complex. 3
Previous administrations and legislators attempted reform,4 but de-
spite widespread agreement on the need for change,5 none of the pro-
posed comprehensive reforms were adopted. The welfare system
continues, with minor revisions, essentially unchanged. Legislators,
fearful of public disapproval, shy away from major changes, especially
in election years.
The American public and many legislators hold an inaccurate view
of government aid programs. Views they hold are often based on
myths which create and maintain illogical categories of deserving and
undeserving recipients. According to one myth, people receiving bene-
fits from programs such as AFDC generally do not deserve aid, but
1. See Policy Statement on Welfare Reform, 35 PuB. WELFARE 17, 18 (Spring 1977).
2. Thus, using the most well known cash assistance programs, an unemployed father may draw
Aid to Families with Dependent Children for Unemployed Parents (AFDC-UP) or General
Assistance (GA) and food stamps in Michigan, as well as associated medical assistance, but
be ineligible for benefits other than food stamps and discretionary help from the local town-
ship trustee in Indiana. See also P. SOMMERS, WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA 15 (1982).
This fact takes on significant implications in light of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89
S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1969). In Shapiro, the Supreme Court held that the right of
citizens to travel throughout the United States is a basic right under the Constitution unless
there is a compelling governmental interest to restrain this right. In this case, the Court
found a statute requiring a one year residency in order to draw welfare benefits unconstitu-
tional. The Supreme Court then went on to state in dicta:
[A] State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare bene-
fits than it may try to fence out indigents generally. Implicit in any such distinction is
the notion that indigents who enter a State with the hope of securing higher welfare
benefits are somehow less deserving than indigents who do not take this consideration
into account. But we do not perceive why a mother who is seeking to make a new life
for herself and her children should be regarded as less deserving because she consid-
ers, among other factors, the level of a State's public assistance. Surely such a mother
is no less deserving than a mother who moves into a particular State in order to take
advantage of its better educational facilities.
Id. at 631-32.
3. See Policy Statement on Welfare Reform, supra note 1.
4. See generally L. LYNN, JR. & D. WHITMAN, THE PRESIDENT AS POLICY MAKER (1980); V.
BURKE & V. BURKE, NIXON'S GOOD DEED: WELFARE REFORM (1974).
5. L. SOBEL, WELFARE & THE POOR 1-2 (1977).
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everyone else receiving government assistance not only deserves it, but
also earned it.
For example, members of the public see Social Security as some-
thing they earned and are entitled to receive. Students from families in
all income brackets eagerly obtain guaranteed student loans6 and allow
the government to pay the interest on the loan while the student is in
school. Qualified middle class homeowners receive federally guaran-
teed mortgages to help them buy homes through the Federal Home
Administration.7 The trucking industry benefits from a publicly estab-
lished and maintained highway system to help it compete with rail-
roads.8 These benefits are lower on a scale of human needs than a
person's need to be fed and housed. Thus, the prevailing myths catego-
rizing recipients as "deserving" or "undeserving" virtually preclude
comprehensive reform.
THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT: PAST ADMINISTRATIONS'
ATTEMPTS AT REFORM
President Johnson, speaking at the 1964 University of Michigan
commencement, announced that it would be the goal of his Adminis-
tration and this country to make a Great Society - one in which pov-
erty was to be eliminated from the face of America in our time.9
Thereafter, varieties of the Negative Income Tax (NIT)' ° appeared in
disguised forms in the 1960's and early 1970's. They were offered as a
remedy for poverty during the Johnson Administration" and as wel-
fare reform measures under both the Nixon' 2 and Carter
Administrations. 13
In 1969, President Nixon proposed the Family Assistance Plan
(FAP), which included both a guaranteed income for families and
wage supplements for poor fathers.14 President Carter presented a Pro-
gram for Better Jobs and Income (PBJI) that proposed a guaranteed
income plan based on a negative income tax (NIT).'5 Both reform at-
tempts failed and poverty still existed although massive welfare pro-
grams were in operation.
While comprehensive reform was being offered by the Carter Ad-
ministration in PBJI, incremental changes were offered in bills by both
the House and the Senate. Representative Al Ullman (D-Ore.), Chair-
man of the House Ways & Means Committee, drafted incremental
6. 20 U.S.C. §§ 421-425, 427-429 (1976).
7. 12 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982).
8. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-104 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
9. Address by President Johnson, University of Michigan Commencement Ceremony (May 22,
1964) reprintedin 18 ANN. OF AMERICA 216-18 (1968).
10. See L. LYNN & D. WHITMAN, supra note 4.
1I. See V. BURKE & V. BURKE, supra note 4, at 141.
12. See L. LYNN & D. WHITMAN, supra note 4, at 20.
13. Id at 263.
14. See V. BURKE & V. BURKE, supra note 4, at xvii.
15. See L. LYNN & D. WHITMAN, supra note 4, at 263.
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changes in House bill 10711.16 In the Senate, the Baker-Bellman bill, 7
and the Kennedy bill' 8 proposed incremental changes, while the Moy-
nihan-Long bill proposed a block grant approach. 19
The change in administrations brought back an incremental ap-
proach under President Reagan. Congress passed the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 198120 implementing incremental changes in-
cluding revised budgeting and eligibility requirements for AFDC.2
These changes by the Reagan Administration cut the welfare budget to
eliminate abuses in the welfare system. Studies are currently analyzing
the impact of Reagan's budget revisions on the nation's needy.22 Pres-
ently, however, no major reform measures are on the horizon,23 and
some writers suggest that welfare reform is politically impossible24 be-
cause of the large number of people with vested interests in existing
welfare programs.25 To fully understand why the welfare system has
evaded so many comprehensive reform measures, first it is necessary to
examine the social attitudes, norms and mores underlying the present
system.
Defining Welfare
The welfare problem begins with the definition.
Public welfare is the term usually used to describe income maintenance
programs, medical aid, and social services provided to certain catego-
ries of needy people. Over the years, the term has gradually been ex-
16. H.R. 10711, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 2141 (1978). H. R. 10711 was designed to
amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, parts A and C of title IV of the Social Security
Act, and the Food Stamp Act of 1977 for the purpose of revising, coordinating, and improv-
ing federal public assistance and food stamp programs and for the purpose of providing
increased employment opportunities for needy families, and for other purposes. 95th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 1751 (1978). For a general overview of reform during this period,
see FOOD RESEARCH AND ACTION CENTER, INC., GUIDE TO WELFARE REFORM 33-34, 39
(1979).
17. S. 2777, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 8061 (1978). S. 2777 was drafted by Howard
Baker, R-Tenn., Henry Bellmon, R-Okla., John Danforth, R-Mo., and Abraham Ribicoff,
D-Conn.
18. S. 3498, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 29417 (1978).
19. S. 3505, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. 30090 (1978).
20. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (codified as
amended 31 U.S.C. § 1331).
21. 31 U.S.C. §§ 2303-06, 2309, 2312-2315, 2319 (1981).
22. See T. Joe, Profiles of Families in Poverty: Effects of the FY 1983 Budget Proposals on the
Poor (Feb. 25, 1982) (unpublished manuscript available through The Center for the Study of
Social Policy, Washington, D.C.).
23. Apparently neither the House nor Senate plans further action for major welfare reform other
than attempts to establish stricter child enforcement provisions. Interview with Sydney Ol-
sen, Staff Member of the Senate Finance Office, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 15, 1983). Inter-
view with Allen Jensen, Staff Director, Subcommittee on Public Assistance and
Unemployment Compensation, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 17, 1983). For example, pres-
ently the Congress is considering H.R. 4325, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), a bill designed to
deal with the problem of parents neglecting their child support responsibilities. See Federal
Funds Trimmed Gradually: Finance Compromise Sends Child Support Bill to Senate, 42
CONG. Q. 737 (Mar. 31, 1984).
24. W. Albrecht, Welfare Reform" An Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone, in WELFARE RE-
FORM IN AMERICA 15, 16 (P. Sommers ed. 1982).
25. Id. at 17.
546
1984] Obstacles to Reform in Welfare and Social Security 547
panded - it originally applied exclusively to cash assistance or relief
programs - until it now is frequently used to describe a network of
government programs designed to protect the economic security,
health and social well-being of all citizens. In the broadest sense, the
term public welfare may even be defined as governmental stimulation
of employment opportunities; the distribution of national income
through taxes, subsidies, or income support programs; insurance
against the loss of earnings; health care; and a wide range of efforts
aimed at improving the quality of life.26
Thus the term welfare includes a much broader category of programs
than "welfare" is normally thought to encompass. 27  Social Security,
though not generally considered welfare, provides millions of people
with an annual income far beyond the beneficiary's original contribu-
tion, 2 based partially on recipients' actual or legislatively perceived
needs. Social Security, however, has not been included by legislators
or the population at large in the definition of welfare. American soci-
ety has created a two-tier system that defines some recipients as deserv-
ing and others as undeserving.
Defining the Welfare Population
The current system divides the welfare population into the "worthy
poor" and the "unworthy poor."" The "worthy poor" are those who
are unable, through age, blindness, or disability to care for themselves.
Assistance is provided to these worthy poor with minimal verification
requirements under Old Age, Survivor, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI).3°
The others, the "unworthy poor", are eligible to receive assistance
only if they fit into a specific legislatively defined category.3 They also
must meet a multitude of income, financial, and additional qualifica-
tions that are not required of a person drawing Social Security benefits.
Thus, in some states an individual attempting to collect welfare benefits
must prove that a child resides with him or her in the home and that
the other spouse is absent before he or she will be considered for cash
assistance benefits.32 Only then will the individual's actual financial
26. Introduction, 35 PUB. WELFARE 5 (Spring 1977).
27. In 1977, the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies found 182 different programs operating
under the broad title of assistance programs to eliminate poverty. See L. Greene, Foreword
to G. WELLS, THE WELFARE DEBATE OF 1978, at vii (1978).
28. R. Myers & B. Schobel, .4 Money's Worth Analysis of Social Security Retirement Benefits
(manuscript to be published in TRANSACroNs); Chicago Tribune, Sept. 25, 1983, at 1, col. 3.
29. This classification evolved from the Elizabethan Poor Laws and remains to the present day.
See J. Hansen, The Role of Government in American Social Welfare 2 (February 1982)
(unpublished manuscript) (available through the National Conference on Social Work)
(hereinafter cited as Role of Government].
30. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.701-.780, 416.901-.998 (1983).
31. These include such programs as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), General
Assistance if available, or other state assistance programs.
32. For example, Indiana has chosen not to adopt Aid to Families with Dependent Children-
Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP). Thus an unemployed family with the father in the home
would not be able to draw cash assistance for rent, clothing or needed items other than
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status be considered and his level of benefits determined. Finally, the
individual must show that other resources were unavailable and may
have to agree to fulfill work requirements before receiving cash
benefits.33
Some sociologists classify welfare recipients as the "disreputable
poor."
This class includes the permanently unemployed, the homeless, the il-
literate, the chronic welfare recipient, and the impoverished aged.
They are virtually worthless on the labor market and so are virtually
worthless in terms of power and prestige as well. . . . Members of
this class are poorly regarded by other Americans. Their supposed la-
ziness, promiscuity, or reliance on public handouts are contrasted with
the morality of the middle class. They tend to lack a common class
consciousness, to be alienated from and cynical about society and to be
fatalistic about their own chances in life. 34
Stigmatizing members of this class as "welfare recipients" suggests that
they would not need assistance if they sought employment. Little evi-
dence indicates that they could obtain employment.35
These pervasive public misunderstandings of welfare programs and
welfare recipients have created a significant obstacle to welfare reform.
These myths and definitional problems are subtly recognized and re-
flected in the legislation outlining the assistance programs. An analysis
of two of these programs, AFDC and Social Security, illustrates how
these underlying misconceptions hinder true reform.
AID TO FAMILIES WITH DEPENDENT CHILDREN
Since its inception in 1935 under the Social Security Act,36 the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)3 7 program has become
the single most controversial portion of the needs-based welfare pro-
grams.38 Unlike Social Security, AFDC enjoys little public support.
Over the years this program, perhaps the classic example of "welfare",
has generated immeasurable criticism from liberal and conservative
politicians, Republicans and Democrats, front line caseworkers at local
through the local township trustee. This type of assistance is limited to emergency needs
where no other resources are available and certain residency requirements are met. IND.
CODE ANN. § 12-2-1-1 to 12-2-1-39 (West 1982 & Supp. 1983-84).
33. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357 (1981) added
work requirements to AFDC. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
34. I. ROBERTSON, SOCIOLOGY 246 (1977) (citations omitted).
35. See H. Jones, The Problem Is (No) Jobs, 38 PuB. WELFARE 27 (1980). "Full employment is
defined by federal economists as the circumstance that pertains when the unemployment rate
stands at 4 percent to 5 percent. This policy confirms structural unemployment as a perma-
nent feature in our society and excludes at least four million of our citizens from the work
force." Id.
36. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (current versions at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-
1397 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
37. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, §§ 401-06, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935) (current version
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
38. S. LEVITAN, PROGRAMS IN AID OF THE POOR FOR THE 1970's 28 (rev. ed. 1973).
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Social Service offices and welfare recipients.39 Both AFDC administra-
tors and welfare study groups criticize the programs on the theoretical
as well as the practical levels.'
Despite the acknowledged need for reform, viable alternatives have
not been developed to reform AFDC. One fundamental reason for the
lack of reform is the general public misconception of how the program
has come to exist as it does today.
The Advent of AFDC
With the Industrial Revolution in the 1600's came a great socioeco-
nomic upheaval.4 Elizabethan society found it could no longer pro-
vide for the poor on a "piece-meal" voluntary basis as determined by
local law and charities. The problem of providing for the poor had
become too big and too varied to be handled by voluntary charity.42
Parliament addressed the problem by enacting the Poor Laws from
which American notions of welfare descended.43
The Great Depression of the 1930's 44 stimulated the same need for
new legislation for the poor in America as that generated in England
during Elizabethan times. During the Depression, poverty became an
unmistakeably national problem.45  What had once been solely the
providence of the states and local charities overwhelmed available re-
sources.' Only the Federal Government was thought capable of alle-
viating the poverty. The Social Security Act of 1935, implemented in
response to the Depression, was the fundamental legislation in the de-
velopment of the present-day welfare system.47The Act established cat-
39. L. GREENE, FREE ENTERPRISE WITHOUT POVERTY 45 (1981); W. Bell, AFDC: Symptom and
Potential, in JUBILEE FOR OUR TIMES 231 (A. Schorr ed. 1977); S. Danziger & R. Plotnick,
The War on Income Poverty Achievements and Failures, in WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA:
PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS 31-52 (P. Sommers ed. 1982); R. Lerman, Discussion, Single-
Parent Households under Alternative Transfer and Tax Systems, in INCOME-TESTED TRANS-
FER PROGRAMS: THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST 446 (I. Garfinkel ed. 1982); H. Aaron, Why is
Welfare so Hard to Reform? in STUDIES IN SOCIAL ECONOMICS, THE BROOKINGS INSTITU-
TION 1, 7, 8, 11, 16 (1973); Interview with Deborah Colton, Policy Associate with the Ameri-
can Public Welfare Association, in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 1983); C. Murray, Safety Nets
and the Truly Needy." Rethinking the Social Welfare System, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION 1,
2 (1982); Policy Statement on Welfare Reform, supra note 1, at 17; But see W. Albrecht,
Welfare Reform- An Idea Whose Time Has Come and Gone, in WELFARE REFORM IN
AMERICA: PERSPECTIVES AND PROSPECTS 15-28 (P. Sommers ed. 1982).
40. See authorities cited at supra note 39.
41. W. TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE IN
AMERICA 6 (1974).
42. Id. at 6-12.
43. See Role of Government, supra note 29, at 2.
44. Id. at 3. The 1929 stock market crash precipitated a severe economic depression which lasted
several years. Millions of workers lost their jobs and their life's savings when factories and
banks closed. Poverty and suffering existed on a larger scale than had ever been known in
the United States. W. TRATTNER, supra note 41, at 228-29.
45. W. TRATTNER, supra note 41, at 229; J. Hansen, An Overview of the State-Federal Relation-
ship in Public Welfare Programs 2 (Feb. 1982) (unpublished manuscript) (available from the
National Conference on Social Welfare) [hereinafter cited as An Overview].
46. Id.
47. An Overview, supra note 45, at 2; Role of Government, supra note 29, at 3.
550 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 11:544
egories of federally-funded aid to those unable to work, which at that
time included the blind, the aged, the disabled, and dependent children
without fathers.4 8 The major criterion for the Aid to Dependent Chil-
dren program (now known as AFDC) was, and still is, the continued
absence of the child's father.49
The AFDC grants provided financial support in lieu of that which
would normally have been provided by the father to the children.5"
Other programs were created to put able-bodied men back to work,5'
however, in the mainstream society of the 1930's a woman with children
was not expected to work outside the home;52 her role was solely to
care for the home and children. These grants were meant to enable the
mother to fulfill her role at home.53
Since this meager beginning in 1935, the AFDC program has grown
tremendously. Its growth doubled between 1947 and 1957, 54 doubled
again between 1957 and 1967,55 then doubled once more in the five
years between 1967 and 1972.56 The total expenditure through the
AFDC program in 1980 was approximately $12.9 billion. 7 The Fed-
eral Government's share of the bill was approximately $6.9 billion.58
Popular Myths and Misconceptions
The cause of the present-day public misconception of AFDC is that
American society underwent a tremendous social and moral change af-
ter AFDC was conceived and implemented. In essence, two key prem-
ises underlying the program changed. First, increasing numbers of
women with children are now working outside the home, even in two
parent families.59 Women who work outside the home, even though
they have small children, are rapidly becoming the norm.60 Conse-
quently, the very idea that an able-bodied female can get government
"hand-outs" to stay at home, while taxpayers must work outside the
48. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)); L. GREENE, supra note 39, at 47.
49. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
50. H. Watts, G. Jakubson & F. Skidmore, Single-Parent Households Under Alternative Transfer
and Tax Systems, in INCOME-TESTED TRANSFER PROGRAMS: THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST
410 (I. Garfinkel ed. 1982).
51. Work Relief and Public Works Appropriation Act of 1938, ch. 554, 52 Stat. 809. The pro-
grams terminated as provided in section one of the Act.
52. H. Watts, G. Jakubson & F. Skidmore, supra note 50, at 410-11.
53. L. GREENE, supra note 39, at 36; H. Watts, G. Jakubson & F. Skidmore, supra note 50, at
410-11.
54. S. LEVITAN, supra note 38, at 30.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CASH AND NON-CASH BENEFITS FOR PERSONS WITH
LIMITED INCOME: ELIGIBILITY RULES, RECIPIENT AND EXPENDITURE DATA 3 (Report No.
83-110) (1983) (prepared by V. Burke).
58. Id. at 172.
59. In an estimated 51.4% of American married couples the wife works outside the home. The
Average Family, Then and Now, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 21, 1983, at 79.
60. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1983, at C13, col. 1.
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home, breeds public contempt for the program. Second, a tremendous
increase in single parenting has occurred since the 1930's.61 When
AFDC was first implemented, the predominant cause of the fathers'
absence was his death.62 Congress did not anticipate the relatively new
and still growing group of never-wed or divorced parents. 63 Yet, in the
poverty-stricken population that includes AFDC recipients as well as
the general American population, the number of single parents contin-
ues to grow.6' In fact, some estimates indicate that almost half the chil-
dren born in the early 1970's will live in a single parent home before
age eighteen. 5 In the majority of instances the mother has custody of
the dependent children.6 6 In essence, this relatively new breed of eligi-
ble recipients has changed the public concept of AFDC from its tradi-
tional "help-the-(worthy)-widow" image to one of rewarding careless
illegitimacy and marital failure. This image, coupled with that of the
lazy but able-bodied unemployed female, casts AFDC in an extremely
unfavorable light in public opinion. The social, economic, and moral
grounds upon which the parameters of AFDC were originally con-
ceived no longer exist in modern America.
Aside from the change in the socio-economic setting, the internal
structures of AFDC and other welfare programs badly need reform.
AFDC and its related welfare programs are riddled with duplication
and overlapping services, a multiplicity of eligibility criteria, run-away
costs, work disincentives, administrative mismanagement and cheating
by recipients. 67 Eligibility levels and other administrative rules and reg-
ulations are implemented to allay public fear and distrust of the pro-
gram, but they increase bureaucracy and administrative costs and add
to the complexity of the program itself.
Unfortunately, attempts to improve the program's poor public im-
age have created additional problems for the recipients and have fur-
ther damaged its public image. For example, eligibility regulations
designed to prevent assistance to all except the truly needy have in fact
created a work disincentive.68 An AFDC mother earning a minimal
61. Statement of Alice M. Rivlin, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, before the House
Select Committee on Children, Youth, and Families (a copy of which is on file at the offices
of the Journal of Legislation). See also 129 CONG. REc. D572 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 1983).
62. L. GREENE, supra note 39, at 47.
63. H. AARON, supra note 39, at 7.
64. N. Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1983 at C13, col. i; See Statement of A. Rivlin, supra note 61.
65. TheAverageAmerican Family, Then andNow, supra note 59, at 79; H. Watts, G. Jakubson &
F. Skidmore, supra note 50, at 410-11.
66. See Statement of A. Rivlin, supra note 61.
67. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, WORK DISINCENTIVES AND INCOME MAINTENANCE
PROGRAMS: A REVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 9 (REPORT. No. 80-119 E) (1980);
Policy Statement on Welfare Reform, supra note 1, at 18-20; J. Turem, Can We Fix AFDC" It
is Time to Consider Possibilities. Apart From Ideology and Budget, 40 PUB. WELFARE 27 (Fall
1982).
68. T. Joe, supra note 22, at ii. This 1982 study on the proposed FY 1983 Federal budget pre-
dicted that:
Incomes for working AFDC families would be reduced so much that parents who
work would generally be little better off - or worse off - than AFDC mothers who
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income at a low paying job ends up having less for her family than she
would by not working at all.6 9 Thus, she stays at home, furthering the
public notion of welfare laziness.
The AFDC program, as it presently exists, has insurmountable
problems. A new system is needed - a system premised upon modem
concepts of working mothers and present-day economic realities. The
overriding obstacle to true welfare reform, however, is not the difficult
task of developing a comprehensible, affordable program of caring for
poor children. The problem is in overcoming the public and legislative
fear of welfare. In a tightening economy with high unemployment,7"
taxpayers are fearful of seeing their paychecks decrease as others live
"on the dole." Legislators are hesitant to even consider attempting re-
form because they fear alienating the public. AFDC recipients, unlike
other segments of the population, generally do not have strong election
day turnouts. Although other segments of the population receive vari-
ous government benefits,7 ' the AFDC segment has received more than
its fair share of criticism because of misunderstandings about the pro-
gram's nature and purpose. Until the public becomes more aware of
the background and purpose of AFDC, it is unlikely that needed re-
form will be politically feasible.
SOCIAL SECURITY: MIDDLE CLASS WELFARE?
Many programs which provide federal assistance to individuals are
not generally perceived as welfare. Well-known examples include stu-
dent loans and interest payments, FHA loans, and tax deductions for
mortgage interest payments. Social Security is frequently described as
72an "insurance" program, but it provides beneficiaries with an annual
income based partially on their actual or legislatively perceived
needs.73 Surprisingly, Social Security does not require its recipients to
undergo rigorous scrutiny in overcoming eligibility requirements as
do not work. In 24 of the 48 states included in the study, the AFDC working mother
earning average wages would end up with less dispensable income than the AFDC
mother who does not work . . . . These 24 states include 65 percent of all AFDC
working parents.
See also L. GREENE, supra note 39, at 32, 42; W. Bell, supra note 39, at 243.
69. Because Medicaid and food stamp eligibility is often based on the same criteria as AFDC
eligibility, a person who attains income to become disqualified for AFDC benefits may also
lose Medicaid and food stamp coverage. Even if the income is sufficient to offset the loss of
AFDC payments, the disqualification for these two related programs may cause a net loss of
support for the family. W. Bell, supra note 39, at 243. See also L. GREENE, supra note 39, at
32.
70. N.Y. Times, Apr. 29, 1983, at A12, col. I.
71. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1976). The Social Security Act refers to the fund in which taxes are depos-
ited as the "Federal Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund."
73. Note the minimum benefit provision instituted in the 1939 amendments to the Social Security
Act, § 209(e)(1), 53 Stat. 1360 (1939) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 402(m) (1976 & Supp. II
1978) (repealed 1981) (reinstated by Act of Dec. 29, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-123, 95 Stat. 1661)).
Also, the average beneficiary gets more out of the program than he puts into it. See R.
Myers & B. Schobel, supra note 28.
[Vol. 11:544
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does the AFDC program.74 Furthermore, recipients of Social Security
do not carry the stigma that follows the recipients of AFDC. There is a
pervasive and significant welfare element embodied in Social Security,
but it is often rationalized as merely a "good deal" for those middle
class recipients fortunate enough to participate in the largest income
transfer program in the United States.75
Advent of Social Security
Compulsory social insurance is the hallmark of the welfare state.76
The social collapse following the Great Depression informed this na-
tion's political leaders that laissez-faire capitalism could not remedy the
extreme crisis of ten million citizens unemployed and eighteen million
people dependent upon emergency relief.77 Attitudes toward social wel-
fare changed across the nation as a new theme of federal policymaking
emerged.78 Federal and state governments became underwriters and in-
surers of the individual's employment, health, income, family and
many risks of modem industrial society.79 Today, Social Security is the
single largest federal program designed to insure retirees and others
against loss of income in old age.8"
Congress originally designed Social Security to meet the problems
of the urban, lower middle class of the 1930's.1 Initially, the benefit
schedule provided only a minimal retirement income for recipients.8 2
Over the next four decades Congress amended the program to include
survivors, disabled workers, and health insurance recipients.8 3 Con-
gress regularly increased benefit levels and expanded the number of
workers contributing to the program. 4 Although it originally resem-
74. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-403 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (Social Security eligibility standards)
with 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1982) (food stamp eligibility standards) and 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1976 &
Supp. 11 1978) (AFDC eligibility standards).
75. See R. Myers & B. Schobel, supra note 28.
76. S. Danziger and R. Plotnick, Income Maintenance Programs and the Pursuit of Income Secur-
ity, ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 130 (1980); H. Girvetz, Welfare
State, in 16 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 512 (D. Sills ed.
1968); STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: INCOME SECURITY 59 (R. Stevens ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as STATUTORY HISTORY].
77. 2 A. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 297-315
(1959).
78. See generally id.
79. See generally Y. AHARONI, THE No-RISK SOCIETY (1981); T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBER-
ALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC AUTHORITY (1979).
80. B. PAGE, WHO GETS WHAT FROM GOVERNMENT 63 (1982); P. Peterson, Social Security. The
Coming Crash, 29 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 34 (Dec. 2, 1982).
81. STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 11.
82. A. MUNNELL, THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY 155 (1977); STATUTORY HISTORY, supra
note 76, at 136, 170.
83. For the amendments to include survivors, see Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch.
666, 53 Stat. 1360 (1939). See also STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 246-49, 251. For
amendments to include the disabled, see Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 666,
64 Stat. 477 (1950). See also STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 484, 488. For amend-
ments to include health insurance, see Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No.
89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965). See also STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 750-58.
84. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360; Social Security Act Amend-
ments of 1946, ch. 951, 60 Stat. 978; Social Security Act Amendments of 1950, ch. 809, 64
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bled an insurance plan in which benefits were based on the worker's
total contributions, the 1939 amendments shaped the program into a
strange hybrid of insurance and social welfare characteristics that dis-
tributed benefits based on the worker's average monthly earnings.85
The history and structure of the Social Security system show that
although the system mainly benefits the middle class, it contains signifi-
cant welfare aspects. While members of the middle class may have
contempt for lower income welfare recipients, many middle to upper
class members also receive welfare in various forms but with no stigma.
Background
The history of Social Security tells the story of American social re-
form. Prevailing attitudes toward social insurance crumbled during the
Depression.86 New federal and state programs developed to soften the
impact of unemployment in old age.87 The 1935 Social Security Act
established a system of benefits for the aged, blind, dependent children
and survivors.88 As one historian described the purpose of the Act:
"[o]verall then, the 1935 Social Security Act seemed calculated to over-
turn a system born of the worst excesses of laissezfaire capitalism."89
The law originally intended to create a system closely resembling a
fully-funded insurance plan based on employment.9" Under the origi-
nal system, workers would contribute a small portion of their earnings
to trust funds so that upon retirement at age 65, they would begin to
receive benefits proportionate to their total contributions.9 Social Se-
curity also resembled an annuity because benefits were related to life-
Stat. 1, 477; Social Security Amendments of 1954, ch. 1206, 68 Stat. '1052; Social Security
Amendments of 1956, ch. 836, 70 Stat. 807; Social Security Amendments of 1958, Pub. L. No.
85-840, 72 Stat. 1013; Social Security Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 925;
Social Security Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-64, 75 Stat. 131; Social Security
Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286; Social Security Amendments of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821; Social Security Amendments of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172,
83 Stat. 737; Act of March 17, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-5, 85 Stat. 5; Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-66, 87 Stat. 152; Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat.
1509. See also STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 247, 303, 372, 505, 529, 584, 609, 758;
A. MUNNELL, supra note 82, at 164-65, 170, 171, 181, 184.
85. See generally A. MUNNELL, supra note 82, at 5-7; R. CAMPBELL, SOCIAL SECURITY: PROMISE
AND REALITY 10-12, 13, 14, 58-63, 71-82 (1977); A. ROBERTSON, THE COMING REVOLUTION
IN SOCIAL SECURITY 13-28, 108-10, 306 (1981); STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 6, 8-
15, 223, 224, 226, 228, 229; P. Peterson, The Salvation of Social Security, 29 N.Y. REV. BOOKS
50-57 (1982); Telephone interview with Rudolph Penner, American Enterprise Institute, in
Washington, D.C. (July 20, 1983).
86. See 2 A. SCHLESINGER, upra note 77.
87. STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 4-12. See generally An Overview, supra note 45, at 2,
3, 9; R. LEVY, T. LEWIS & P. MARTIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SOCIAL WELFARE AND
THE INDIVIDUAL 44-60 (1971).
88. Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397
(1976 & Supp. V. 1981)). See also STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 167.
89. STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 10.
90. Id. at 127, 227-30.
91. Id. at 169; The Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531 § 201(a), 49 Stat. 620 (current version at
42 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). This Act set up a reserve account in the U.S.
Treasury for these purposes.
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time earnings. 92 Much like a fully-funded pension plan, taxes or
contributions were held in a reserve fund until the individual became
eligible for benefits.93
Within four years of passing the Social Security Act, Congress sig-
nificantly altered the insurance aspects of the legislation.94 The
amended Act of 1939 emphasized social welfare and social adequacy
rather than a return of the worker's contributions.9 Congress empha-
sized social adequacy by adding a minimum benefit provision entitling
individuals to a minimum monthly payment regardless of whether that
payment exceeded the individual's average contributions. 96 The
amendments also set up a new pay-as-you-go plan which based benefits
on the contributor's average wage rather than on his or her total earn-
ings, as the previous plan had done.97 Instead of accumulating a re-
serve fund, contributions (tax revenues) were immediately paid to
current retirees with excesses retained in a new trust fund.98 The
amended Act thus moved the system away from the insurance plan
Congress originally envisaged, and replaced it with a plan containing a
number of characteristics usually found in need-based welfare pro-
grams, such as minimum benefits and benefits in excess of
contributions.
Following this major, relatively unpublicized legislative change,
each Administration after Roosevelt from 1938 to 1983 pressured Con-
gress to increase both the number of workers covered by Social Secur-
ity and the amount of benefits paid retirees. 99 In almost all instances
Congress responded generously. In 1954, Congress added disability in-
surance to the program.l °° Medical insurance followed in 1965.01 By
the time President Johnson ushered in his "Great Society" programs in
the mid- 1960's, Social Security was politically "sacrosanct."10 2 As a re-
92. See STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76.
93. See The Social Security Act of 1935, ch. 531, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 620.
94. The Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360. This Act completely
amended Title II of the original act to set up a trust fund, changing the benefit formula from
"cumulative lifetime earnings after 1936" to "average earnings in covered work." See STAT-
UTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 242, 247.
95. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360. See STATUTORY HISTORY,
supra note 76, at 242, 247.
96. The Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 209(e)(1), 53 Stat. 1360. Portions of
this Act established a minimum benefit. See STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 247-52.
97. The Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360. See also STATUTORY
HISTORY, supra note 76, at 247-52. A. MUNNELL, supra note 82, at 110, 127, 128.
98. The Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360.
99. See Statutory History, supra note 76, at 247, 303, 372, 505, 529, 584, 609, 758, 884. The
Social Security Amendments, supra note 84 often resulted from the efforts by each adminis-
tration to enlarge the Social Security system as discussed in STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note
76, at 95, 315, 489, 601, 663, 687, 707, 884.
100. Social Security Act Amendments of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-767, 68 Stat. 1130 (1954). See also
STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 485.
101. The Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965). See
also STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 758.
102. STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 5; D. Koitz, G. Kollman & N. Miller, Financing
Social Security. Options considered in 1983, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 4 (Issue
Brief No. 82-126, archived May 16, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Financing Social Security].
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suit of the changes in Social Security and because Congress indexed
benefits to the Consumer Price Index in 1972 to allow for inflation dur-
ing the 1970's, expenditures for Social Security rose from sixteen billion
in 1965 to over 100 billion in 1980.03 Even when adjusted for inflation
the total amount expended for Social Security from 1940 to 1980 has
increased substantially."° In 1960 Social Security constituted 12.6%"° '
of the Federal budget, as compared to 20.6% in 1980.1°
Thus, the Social Security system no longer resembles the fully-
funded insurance program originally designed by Congress in 1935.107
In addition to providing a marginal insurance plan, Congress amended
the program to focus on eliminating poverty among the aged by redis-
tributing income from workers to retirees.' After the 1939 amend-
ments, the system no longer related the benefits workers received to
their payroll contributions, but rather linked benefits, in a rough fash-
ion, to the worker's average wage.'0 9 The 1939 amendments also se-
cured minimum monthly benefits for those workers whose
contributions were insufficient."0 Because Congress has expanded the
system by including more employees and increasing their benefits and
because the system is funded by a pay-as-you-go financing method,
most retirees and benefit recipients since 1940 have received much
more in benefits than they ever contributed."' Therefore, the Social
Security program is no longer simply an insurance program. It has sig-
nificant welfare aspects, because benefits are based on the needs of the
recipients. Today Social Security benefits have essentially two main so-
cioeconomic effects: to reduce poverty among the elderly, and to redis-
tribute income from workers to the older retired sector.12
NATURE OF SOCIAL SECURITY-INSURANCE OR WELFARE?
Social Security is financed with a regressive payroll tax which
places a greater burden on lower income earners. 113 This vertical ineq-
uity is somewhat balanced by the marginally progressive benefit struc-
103. B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 65; Financing Social Security, supra note 102, at 4 (Table 1); P.
Martin, The Art of Decoupling: Keeping Social Security's Promise Up to Date, 65 CORNELL L.
REv. 748-800 (1980).
104. Y. AHARONI, supra note 79, at 98-109; B. PAGE, supra note 80; Financing Social Security,
supra note 102, at 4 (Table 1).
105. Financing Social Security, supra note 102.
106. Id.
107. See STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76.
108. B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 63; Telephone interview with Rudolph Penner, supra note 85.
109. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
110. Id.
111. R. Myers & B. Schobel, supra note 28.
112. B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 63; P. Peterson, supra note 85, at 50. Telephone interview with
Rudolph Penner, supra note 85. See generally G. TULLOCK, THE ECONOMICS OF INCOME
DISTRIBUTION (1983).
113. R. CAMPBELL, supra note 85, at 6-9; A. MUNNELL, supra note 82, at 89-90; B. PAGE, supra
note 80, at 66, 67. A regressive tax is a tax that has a greater incidence on lower income
earners; that is, dollar for dollar, lower income earners pay a greater percent of their total
income than higher income earners under such a tax.
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ture."14  Consequently income is redistributed from higher income
classes to lower income classes. In essence, higher level income earners
receive a larger absolute share under the system, but they receive pro-
portionately less than lower income contributors. Nevertheless, most
beneficiaries receive substantially similar benefits regardless of their
contribution."1 5 The redistribution of income through the benefit struc-
ture reveals that the primary function of Social Security is to eliminate
poverty in old age.
Social Security also redistributes income from the young to the old.
The pay-as-you-go system taxes present-day workers to pay benefits to
today's retirees, survivors, disabled, sick and dependent children.' 16
The system requires a large ratio of workers to retirees." 7 Because
workers have historically far outnumbered retirees, Congress has been
able to enact benefit increases each year." 8 If the proportion of work-
ers to retirees becomes too small, then payroll contributions will be in-
sufficient to meet the demands of the program. Social Security benefits
to the retirees may then have to be reduced. Because the average age
of Americans is rising,"I9 each year there are more retirees demanding
Social Security benefits. 120 Thus, each year the cost of redistributing
income from the earner to the retiree becomes greater and the ability of
the government to transfer income from the earner to the retiree be-
comes more difficult.' 2 ' Sometime in the next century, payroll taxes
must be significantly raised, benefit levels cut, or both.'12  The abun-
dant benefits enjoyed by present retirees will not be available to the
future retirees whose payroll taxes currently support the system, unless
payroll taxes rise with the increasing proportion of retirees. 23 The
payroll tax workers pay must rise to supply benefits for the steadily
increasing number of retirees, but the number of workers is not rising
fast enough to provide sufficient revenues. 24
114. See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 67; R. CAMPBELL, supra note 85, at 6-9. Because the benefit
structure is progressive, the more the earner contributes, the higher the total monthly amount
the earner receives at retirement. The Social Security benefit structure is only marginally
progressive, that is, the earner does not receive an extra dollar for every additional dollar
contributed, but somewhat less, as the earner's total contributions pass a specified amount.
The actual benefit structure is complex and technical. For a detailed account, see generally
R. CAMPBELL, supra note 85.
115. See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 67; R. CAMPBELL, supra note 85, at 6-9.
116. See discussion supra note 83 and accompanying text. The 1939 Social Security Amend-
ments, ch. 666, 53 Stat. 1360, changed the program to a pay-as-you-go system. See generally
A. MUNNELL, supra note 82, at 84.
117. See U.S. NATIONAL COMMISION ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM 55-59 (1983) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON
SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM].
118. See STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76 and accompanying text; A. MUNNELL, supra note
82, at 160-61, 172-81.
119. See REPORT ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM, supra note 117, at 76, 79.
120. Id. at 293 (Table 11).
121. See P. Peterson, supra note 80, at 37-38.
122. See A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 51-54, 56, 81-104, 290-92; P. PETERSON, supra note 80,
at 37-38.
123. See A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 51-54, 56, 81-104, 290-92.
124. Id
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The Social Security system also redistributes income through the
minimum benefit formula. 2 5 This formula provides that any worker
having worked a minimum number of hours every ninety days will re-
ceive a minimum benefit. Thus, in a substantial number of instances
benefits do not even remotely match the individual's contributions.
26
The Social Security system contains far-reaching and substantial
"welfare" aspects since it provides benefits far in excess of individual
contributions. The term "welfare" denotes government programs that
provide payments or services based on need, not previous tax contribu-
tions. 27 "Welfare" may also denote government payments in excess of
individuals' tax contributions when the payments are made because of
a perceived need. Social Security resembles welfare because Congress
presumes the elderly need benefit payments far in excess of their contri-
butions to prevent them from falling below the poverty level. 28 Any
payments beyond an individual's contribution are thus based on need,
not earnings. As in other welfare programs, this proportion of Social
Security benefits is neither earned nor contributed by the recipient.
In many respects the program resembles welfare more than insur-
ance; yet unlike welfare, Social Security curiously benefits primarily
middle-income workers. 129 In spite of its welfare characteristics, stan-
dards of eligibility under Social Security differ substantially from
means-tested programs such as AFDC or Food Stamps. 3° Applicants
for these benefit programs must show need by demonstrating that their
income falls below certain official levels.' 3 ' The scope of inquiry al-
lowed the administrators of such programs to investigate an applicant's
income level is much broader than that of administrators of the Social
Security program. The primary differences in Social Security recipi-
ents and AFDC or Food Stamp recipients are the recipient's age, his-
torical and present income, and in the case of AFDC, marital status. 132
The policy distinction appears to derive from historical attitudes which
125. See A. MUNNELL, supra note 82, at 38, 51-52. The minimum benefit formula was introduced
in 1939 and provided a minimum monthly benefit as a floor for beneficiaries, to provide for
their need.
126. See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 67.
127. This is the author's definition based on a functional, not a categorical conception of govern-
ment benefits. The distinction between need-based programs and contributory programs is
less clear than the public believes or the programs seem to imply.
128. If the total amount that average OASDHI recipients have received in retirement checks
above contributions deducted from their payroll earnings could be compared with the
amount of funds allocated to AFDC and food stamp programs, then a better comparison
would be possible between "welfare" payments to the poor and "welfare" payments to the
middle class.
129. See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 32-35.
130. The OASDHI system is also more efficient and enjoys more public support. Compare 42
U.S.C. §§ 401-403 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) and 7 U.S.C. § 2014 (1982) (food stamp program
eligibility standards) with 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1976 & Supp. II 1978) (AFDC eligibility
standards).
131. See generally id.
132. 7 U.S.C. § 2014; (1982) (Food Stamp eligibility standards); 42 U.S.C. § 608 (1976 & Supp. II
1978) (AFDC eligibility standards); 42 U.S.C. § 401 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978) (Social Security
entitlement status).
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place a heavier burden on the poor to prove their claims under the
relevant programs.'33 Myths behind Social Security, on the other
hand, absolve recipients under the program from this burden because
many believe that these benefits are entirely earned.
The primary myth surrounding Social Security benefits is that they
are earned. In contrast, the public perceives AFDC and Food Stamp
benefits as "handouts." While many needy persons must struggle to
subsist on AFDC and Food Stamps, middle-income Social Security re-
cipients receive benefits many times exceeding their original contribu-
tions. 134 These excess benefits might also be called "handouts" but
usually the public rationalizes them as a "good deal." The public gen-
erally does not perceive these inequities, but if it did, Congress proba-
bly could no longer justify this middle class welfare program. 35 The
American system of social welfare perpetuates present economic ineq-
uities based on outmoded attitudes and public misperceptions. 136
For example, the Federal Government has characterized Social Se-
curity as insurance since the act was passed in 1935.137 Government
officials use terms such as "insurance," "beneficiary," "premium,"
"earned right," "insured worker" and "insured status." 138 This unfortu-
nate use of words confuses the public and misleads it into overlooking
the welfare aspects inherent in the system. The myth perpetuates itself
since taxes come from employment earnings and are paid into a sepa-
rate trust fund 13 9 rather than into the general treasury fund. The myth
that Social Security is insurance fails because benefits are structured
not on continual contributions, but to protect individuals against pov-
erty and income inequality in old age. Finally, unlike the Social Secur-
ity System, no private insurance program structures its benefits to favor
lower income classes while requiring beneficiaries to make compulsory
contributions and satisfy statutory conditions in order to receive
benefits. 140
Social Security has evolved into the largest federal income transfer
program designed to protect middle class wage earners against poverty
in old age.' 41 In 1981, retirees under the plan received an average bene-
fit of $4,614 a year. 142 Still, only nine percent of benefits paid under the
program go to individuals below the official poverty level. 14 3 A full
thirty percent go to those who have incomes between the poverty level
133. SeeAn Overview, supra note 45, at 3-9.
134. See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 67.
135. See R. MYERS & B. SCHOBEL, supra note 28, at 39.
136. STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 242, 247.
137. See STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, the comments of President Roosevelt upon signing
the Social Security Act, at 166-67, 247.
138. See BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST
FUND, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT 46, 84 (1983) [hereinafter cited as BOARD OF TRUSTEES].
139. 42 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1976 and Supp. 11 1978).
140. Id.
141. See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 67.
142. Id.
143. See P. Peterson, supra note 85, at 53. See also OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND STATISTICS, So-
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and twice that level.44
Admittedly, Social Security has lifted large numbers of individuals
from the poverty level. 45 Nevertheless, total expenditures for the So-
cial Security program have generally exceeded the entire outlay for
food stamps, AFDC, Medicaid and Supplementary Security Income. 146
In simple dollars expended, welfare for the poor falls far short of wel-
fare for the middle class. 47 A remarkable thirty percent of Social Se-
curity benefits goes to the top twenty percent of retiree households.
These households are the most prosperous in the United States and
receive forty percent of the nation's total income. 48 One may wonder
why a system aimed at alleviating poverty and redistributing income to
lower income groups pays these sums to the wealthiest classes. One
reason is that if higher income classes were cut out of Social Security,
the program could no longer maintain its broad base of acceptance and
a stigma would overshadow benefits. The focus of the system would
then shift entirely to eliminating poverty.
The benefits presently paid to the average Social Security recipient
will far outweigh contributions until well into the next century. 49 So-
cial Security expenditures can not continue to rise at this rate because
the American population continues to age and birth rates continue to
fall.' Even the minimal change brought by immigration alone will
not be enough to increase government revenues to support the elderly
in the twenty-first century.' 5 ' Current myths, propounded by oppor-
tunists and short-sighted public officials, do nothing but further post-
pone the attention and the leadership this situation calls for.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM
The public does not understand the nature of Social Security and
the rocks toward which the ship of middle class entitlements is headed.
The system needs long-term financial reform beginning with realistic
projections of future economic and demographic trends of the working
population by the trustees of Social Security. Future recipients cannot
base their retirement plans on present unrealistic projections which de-
rive from unduly optimistic economic and demographic assump-
tions. 5 2 So long as taxes under the Social Security system and worker
CIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
STAFF PAPER No. 41, INCOME OF THE POPULATION 55 AND OVER 54 (1981).
144. See P. Peterson, supra note 85, at 53.
145. See Financing Social Security, supra note 102, at 4. Only 9.5% of Americans aged 55 to 64 and
15.7% of those 65 and older lived in poverty in 1960 compared with 21.5% and 35.2% for each
group respectively in 1980 as shown by Table 1. See also B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 63-65.
146. See Y. AHARONI, supra note 79, at app.
147. See B. PAGE, supra note 80, at 67.
148. See P. Peterson, supra note 85, at 53.
149. See generally A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 82-99.
150. See REPORT ON SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM, supra note 117, at 43, 79.
151. See A. Munnell, A Calmer Look at Social Security, 30 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 41 (1983); R.
Rinder, We Can Afford to Support the Elderly, 30 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 46 (1983).
152. See BOARD OF TRUSTEES, supra note 138, at 2-5, 34, 45-49.
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participation are compulsory, Congress should have a legal duty to
guarantee present-day workers a fair return on their payroll contribu-
tions while re-establishing a benefit structure which is reasonably re-
lated to workers' contributions. Congress should examine why middle
income earners in retirement presently receive benefits exceeding many
times their contributions to the program, while AFDC and food stamp
recipients must carry a heavier burden to receive their welfare benefits.
Each contributor should receive an annual benefit statement to show
what he or she has contributed. 53 Each contributor should know what
benefits are forthcoming and receive current and accurate statements
and projections of Social Security trust funds from year to year, and
decade to decade. If workers must participate in the system to prevent
poverty among the elderly, then they deserve a disclosure of the sol-
vency of the system. Future demographic and economic trends will
seriously threaten the Social Security system. Social Security cannot
continue to provide benefits at the present rate in the next century. The
system should be reformed by disclosing to the public the real purpose
and the long-term insolvency of this major income-transfer program.
The program cannot simply continue on the same course of annual fi-
nancing increases and broadening the benefit structure by Congress.
To do so would leave a bleak future for today's worker.
CONCLUSION
When President Roosevelt wrote his plan in 1935 for social secur-
ity,'54 he perceived the changing needs of American social and eco-
nomic structure. American society had evolved, at that point, from a
rural farming community where a person could survive by living off the
land, to an urban industrial society where the cities no longer met the
needs of all its inhabitants. His program reflected this need and created
a fallback system for those who were victims of that change.
As American society enters a highly technological age, machines
are replacing many unskilled laborors. 5 5 The system that President
Roosevelt created in the 1930's was never designed to meet today's
problems. It was never intended to deal with permanent unemploy-
ment. Rather it was designed to provide assistance only until every
member of society was fully employed.
Existing subsidy programs reflect the idea that large groups of peo-
ple in our society - children, students, the disabled, blind, and in-
firmed - cannot be expected to seek employment. Those whose skills
are not needed by society are also entitled to draw benefits regardless of
whether they fit into a particular category, until they can be retrained
or society again has a need for their services.
153. See generally A. ROBERTSON, supra note 85, at 111-21 for this suggestion.
154. STATUTORY HISTORY, supra note 76, at 242. See A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 77.
155. Manufacturing Is in Flower, TIME, March 26, 1984, at 50-52.
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Americans at every income level receive significant subsidies from
the Federal Government, such as home mortgage assistance, student
loans, and Social Security benefits. Yet, the people who are in greatest
need are living below the poverty level and are labeled as undeserving.
This label of "undeserving poor" developed despite the substantial sim-
ilarities between programs such as AFDC and Social Security, which
are targeted for very different groups of people but meet similar needs.
When closely examined, the conclusion that Social Security recipi-
ents are worthy and AFDC recipients are unworthy is illogical. The
paralyzing myths defining government benefit plans must be discarded
now and an uncategorized, integrated plan must be enacted to meet
human needs in America.
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APPENDIX I
INDICATORS OF SOCIAL SECURITY'S GROWTH AND
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE
1960
(OA
Expenditure as % of Federal budget ............ 12.6%
Expenditure as % of GNP ...................... 2.33%
Tax rates ............................. 3.0%
Taxes paid by worker with average earnings .... $120.21
Covered workers ............................... 73 million
Beneficiaries ................................... 14 million
Worker to beneficiary ratios .................... 5.1 to 1
Earnings replacement for new retirees (benefits
as a % of final earnings for average
earner) .................................... 33.3%
Social security as % of personal income ......... 2.8%
Poverty trends (% in poverty) 1959 and 1980
Age 55 to 64 ............................... 21.5%
Age 65 and older .......................... 35.2%
Total population ........................... 22.4%
1980
SDI)*
20.6%
4.79%
5.08%
$635.68
115 million
35 million
3.3 to 1
51.1%
5.6%
9.5%
15.7%
13.0%
* Note: Excludes Health Insurance
SOURCES: D. Koitz, G. Kollman & N. Miller, Financing Social Security: Options Con-
sidered in 1983, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 4, at Table 1 (Issue
Brief No. 82-126 archived May 16, 1983).
